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ABSTRAK 
 
Pengswastaan syarikat milik kerajaan adalah bertujuan untuk mengatasi 
prestasi yang tidak memuaskan daripada syarikat tersebut. Kajian ini 
ditumpukan kepada penilaian prestasi operasi dan kewangan syarikat yang 
diswastakan yang menerbitkan saham di pasaran modal Malaysia. 
Penyelidikan dibuat dengan menyiasat prestasi syarikat selepas pengswastaan, 
and menilai prestasi tawaran awam permulaan (IPOs) untuk jangka masa 
pendek dan jangka masa panjang. Analisis statistik dibuat dalam menilai 
prestasi syarikat dalam hal ini diwakili dengan prestasi proksi iaitu  i.e. pulangan 
jual (ROS), pulangan harta (ROA), pulangan stok (ROE), penjualan sebenar 
dan keuntungan bersih pada beberapa faktor yang dijangkakan mempengaruhi 
prestasi tersebut iaitu sekatan belanjawan yang lemah, peratusan saham yang 
diterbitkan, saham yang diagihkan kepada pegawai, dan perubahan pasukan 
pengurusan di atasan. Beberapa perkara iaitu peratusan saham yang 
diterbitkan, ketidakpastian tentang nilai syarikat di masa hadapan, nilai pasaran 
satu bulan sebelum penerbitan saham, ukuran syarikat, dan nilai saham yang 
diterbitkan pada hari pertama perdagangan dan pulangan permulaan dianalisis 
secara statistik untuk menilai prestasi tawaran awam permulaan pada jangka 
masa pendek dan jangka masa panjang.  Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa 
prestasi proksi ROS, ROA and ROE berkurangan, dan penjualan sebenar dan 
keuntungan bersih syarikat menjadi lebih baik selepas pengswastaan.  Faktor-
faktor yang menyebabkan perubahan indeks prestasi ini tidak sama, 
bergantung kepada proksi yang dinilai. Faktor yang menyebabkan perubahan 
dalam ROS adalah hutang jangka pendek terhadap jumlah asset and saham 
yang diagihkan kepada pegawai. Peratusan saham yang diterbitkan dan saham 
yang diagihkan kepada pegawai merupakan perkara yang memberi kesan 
terhadap ROA, sedangkan ROE dipengaruhi oleh perubahan pasukan 
pengurusan di tingkat atas sahaja. Penjualan sebenar dipengaruhi oleh 
peratusan saham yang dijual dan saham yang diagihkan kepada pegawai, 
sedangkan keuntungan bersih tidak dipengaruhi oleh apa apa faktor yang 
dikaji.  Kajian menunjukkan bahawa pada amnya IPOs terkurang harga 
sedangkan prestasi jangka panjang tidak terkurang mahupun terlebih harga. 
Hanya besarnya pulangan permulaan mempengaruhi prestasi tawaran awam 
permulaan untuk tempoh satu, tiga dan lima tahun.  Kajian ini mengesan satu 
pola terlebih harga (pulangan negatif) tempoh jangka panjang yang tidak 
bermakna. 
 xvi
THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF NEWLY 
PRIVATIZED STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Privatization is the transferring of ownership from state to private ownership 
expecting that the lackluster and unsatisfactory performance of state-owned 
enterprises can be improved. This study was focuses on the evaluation of 
operating and financial performances of the privatized firms which issued 
shares in capital market. The research was carried out by investigating the 
performance of the firms after privatization, and evaluating the performance of 
initial public offerings (IPOs) on the short-run and the long-run. The 
performance were studied through statistical analysis of the dependency of 
several independent variables namely performance proxies i.e. soft budget 
constraint, fraction of share sold, share allocated to employee and top 
management team change on dependent variables i.e. return on sales (ROS), 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), real sale and net income. 
Several factors associated with the variation in initial returns such as 
percentage of share sold, uncertainty about the future firm value, market index 
fluctuation prior to the issue, size of firm and the value of issue on the first day 
of trading were analyzed statistically to evaluate the short-run and the long-run 
performances. The results showed that the performance proxies ROS, ROA 
and ROE deteriorated and real sales and net profit of the firms improved upon 
privatization. The factors that are responsible to the performance changes differ 
depending on the performance proxies. The factors responsible for ROS are the 
short-term debt to total asset and the share allocated to employee, the fraction 
of share sold and the share allocated to employee are responsible for ROA, 
while the ROE is affected by the top management team change only. The real 
sale is influenced by the fraction of share sold and the share allocated to 
employee, while net profit is not affected by any factor considered in this study. 
The study also indicated that, on average, the IPOs are underpriced while the 
long-run performances of IPOs are neither underpriced nor overpriced. The 
factors that influence the initial returns are percentage of share sold, uncertainty 
about the future value of the firm, market index fluctuation, size of firm and the 
value of issue on the first day of trading. Only the magnitude of the initial returns 
significantly affects the one-, three- and five-year long-run IPOs. The study 
observed a pattern of underperformance (negative returns) of the long-run IPOs 
but statistically insignificant. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Privatization as a policy of transferring ownership from state to private or public 
assets has been one of the most popular economic policy for the last twenty five 
years.  Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government which came to rule 
United Kingdom in 1979 is regarded as the pioneer of the modern privatization 
programs. The policy has been adopted by many countries in which 
governments from various political backgrounds enthusiastically sold state-
owned enterprises (SOEs, hereafter) to private investors expecting a significant 
improvement of the companies.  This privatization policy has transformed the 
role of the state in the economy in almost every country in every continent from 
industrialized nations such as the United Kingdom, France, United States, and 
Japan to emerging countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Philippine in Asia, as well as Chile, Brazil, and Mexico  in Latin America.  
The first countries to adopt privatization programs are the former Soviet-
Union and countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) regions.  The 
Soviet Union took up the privatization of SOEs as part of an integrated effort to 
transform their economies from a command-based economy to global market 
economy. The policy was then adopted by many other countries such as 
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria (Megginson, Nash & van 
Randenborgh, 1994). Thus, the political change around the world and the 
budget deficit, as well as the unsatisfactory and lackluster performance of most 
SOEs has shifted the government economic policy.  
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Malaysia as one of the leading economy from emerging market has 
embrace privatization since early 1980. The generally lackluster performance 
and unsatisfactory of state-owned enterprises together with economic crisis in 
the form of recession required the change in the policy.  The then Malaysia 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad first announced his government’s 
privatization policy in 1983. Issuing shares in capital market is one popular 
mode of privatization in Malaysia which usually involves very large companies. 
To date, there have been 41 companies privatized through issuing shares in 
Bursa Malaysia (EPU, 2002).  Some large and well-known companies amongst 
others are Malaysia Airlines, Telekom Malaysia, TV3, and Proton. These 
companies play very important role in Bursa Malaysia after privatization (Jomo, 
1995b). 
 Now after more than two decades of privatization policy in many 
countries in the world, the impacts of the policy have been studied using various 
methodologies.  For example, Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1994) 
using case study approach reported an average net welfare gains in 11 of 12 
privatized companies considered in their study which equal on average 26 
percent as compared to the sales of the firm before privatized. Using large 
sample from many countries and many industries and applying the same 
methodology, Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998), and D’Sousa and Megginson (1999) report that on average the 
performance of SOEs is improving upon privatization.  On the other hand, 
Harper (2001), using a sample of Czech firms, reports that the efficiency and 
the profitability of the firms decrease immediately following privatization.   
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   Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) report that the performance of the 
British Airlines improves upon privatization.  Ramamurti (1997) and La Porta 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), using a single industry sample, also report a 
favorable performance upon privatization. On the other hand, Martin and Parker 
(1995) find that only less than half British firms they studied perform better after 
being privatized. Newberry and Pollit (1997) conclude that British Electricity 
Company’s (CEGB) restructuring and privatization was in fact worthwhile, 
however, it could have been better implemented taking into account of public’s 
welfare.  Privatization program in some transition countries, primarily Russia is 
considered failed (Nellis, 1999).  Privatization through mass and rapid schemes 
as in these transition economies of former Soviet Union and Central Easter 
European countries turned over assets to people who are lacking incentives, 
skills, and resources to manage the firm. In this institutional vacuum, 
privatization can and has led to stagnation rather than to better financial results 
and increased efficiency.  
In short, study on the impact of privatization on the firm performance 
seems inconclusive with majority reporting favorable changes but there are 
some studies reporting the opposite.   
 Criticism of the existence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is not a 
common sense but is based on theories.  Most prominent theories that support 
privatization are notably property right, public choice and principal-agent theory.  
From point of view of property rights literatures, when a company has no clear 
residual claimant, no individual or group with a clearly specified right to claim 
any residual benefits or surplus left after other claims are met, the company will 
be less efficient (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Demsetz, 1988 and Grossman & 
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Hart, 1986).  Since no one clearly benefit from SOE’s efficient operation, no one 
will be strongly motivated to hold management accountable for performance, 
hence agency problems will not be reduced.  Thus, the property right analysis of 
public ownership leads to the conclusion that public enterprises are less 
economically efficient than private enterprises.  
Other school of thought that shares a view of weaknesses of public 
ownership and hence providing the rational for privatization is public choice 
theory.  Public choice theory suggests that public managers, bureaucrats and 
politicians will use their control of SOEs to pursue their own interest, rather than 
the state firm’s efficiency (Niskanen, 1971).  Privatization allows profit-
maximizing entrepreneurs to take the place of size-maximizing-bureaucrats and 
vote-maximizing politicians.  From the vantage point of the management of 
public enterprise, privatization alters the firm’s criteria of success.  Under public 
ownership which leads to large subsidies and other concessions, it is more 
worthwhile to lobby minister and key public official for fund than the diligent 
search for ways of reducing costs.  On the other hand, privatization, by freeing 
enterprises from the burden of political inference and non-market criteria, limits 
politicians’ ability to redirect the enterprise’s activities in a way that promote 
their personal agenda or yield to a short-term political pressure at the expense 
of market efficiency, clarifies the objectives of the enterprise, and lead to 
enhanced economic performance. 
Within the agency view, there are two perspectives on the causes of the 
existence of poor incentives for efficiency. The first one termed managerial 
perspective, states that monitoring is poor in publicly owned firms and therefore 
the incentives for efficiency are low powered (Vickers & Yarrow, 1989). The 
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second one, the political perspective, claims that political interference is what 
distorts the objectives and the constraints facing the public managers (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1996).  The reason that the public managers are poorly monitored 
because the firms are not traded in capital market, as is the case of any private 
firms.  This fact eliminates the threat of take-over when the firms perform poorly.  
Additionally, shareholders cannot observe and influence the performance of the 
enterprises (Yarrow, 1986).   
The political perspective argues that distortions in both the objective 
function that managers seek to maximize (Shapiro and Willig, 1990) and the 
constraints they face, through the so-called soft budget constraints problem 
(Kornai, 1980), result in lower efficiency under public ownership.  Public 
managers, who tend to report to a politician and pursue their political careers, 
incorporate to the objective function aspects related to maximization of 
employment at the cost of efficiency, and political prestige (the empire building 
hypothesis).  The reason why managers are able to do that without facing the 
threat of bankruptcy is related to the second distortion, the soft budget 
constraint.  In any situation in which the firms have engaged in unwise 
investments, it will be in the interest of the government to bail the firm out using 
the public budget.  The rational for this relies on the fact that the bankruptcy of 
the firm would have a high political cost, whose burden would be distributed 
within a well-defined political group, like unions.  On the other hand, the cost of 
the bailout can be spread over the taxpayers, a less organized, larger group in 
society, with diversified interests and preferences.  The threat of bankruptcy is 
non-credible under public ownership because the political loss involved in 
closing  a  publicly  owned  company  is  larger  than  the  political  cost of using 
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Taxpayer money to bail it out.  
Similar with privatization in other countries, many scholars as well as 
general folks have questioned the merits of privatization in Malaysia because 
despite of the privatization program, the government still retains a “golden 
share” of the company.  This reflects the intention of the government to interfere 
on corporate matters if considered important at any time.  Due to the policy, the 
privatization in Malaysia is sometimes referred as partial privatization.  With this 
policy, it is questionable that the privatization program can achieve its objectives 
including those officially identified by the government (Rugayah, 1995). While 
the partial privatization indeed changes the distribution of welfare, the firm 
behaviors is not necessarily. Hence, the partial privatization may be just a policy 
aimed to impress the people that the government has adopted the privatization 
policy without actually changing the decision making process (Jomo, 1995a). 
Privatization emulates debates because theoretically it is a good policy to 
improve the firm performance which is lacking under state ownership, however 
empirically the result is doubtful. Empirical evidences show mixed results. This 
indicates that evidences are inconclusive and more studies are warranted to 
better explain the phenomenon.   
 As the debate on the impact of privatization on firm operating 
performance is going on, there is another area of privatization that is 
challenging to study but relatively less researched, that is, financial performance 
of stocks of the firms that are privatized through share-issue privatization (SIP, 
hereafter).  In SIP, a firm is privatized through shares issue to the public through 
a stock exchange.  SIPs unlike private-sector companies are interesting 
because they are generally large, well-known and have been in existence for 
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many years.  For instance, the world single largest initial public offering (IPO, 
hereafter) in history involves SIP i.e. IPO of Japan Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT) which raised almost US$40 billion (Megginson & Netter, 
2001). Due to their size and long operating history, the firms privatized through 
SIP should have uncovered considerable information to the general public and 
hence, pose less uncertainty to investors.  Consequently, privatization IPOs 
(PIPOs, hereafter) should have been less underpriced and in the long-run the 
PIPOs return behavior should have been better.  
PIPO, for some respects, have many things in common with private-
sector IPO of privately-held companies.  However, it is also reasonable to argue 
that there are differences with respect to length of operating history, size and 
riskiness of the companies.  Further, according to Perotti (1993), a government 
carries many objectives in PIPO.  Beside their intention to generate revenue the 
government has other objectives such as to encourage share ownership to the 
people, to develop capital market, to gain support in privatization program and 
last but not least to lure votes in general election. Thus, with many strings 
attached on the privatization IPO, it appears that  private-sector IPO is different 
from PIPO in many respects.  Consequently, it is very challenging to study the 
phenomenon of underpricing in privatization IPO as an additional knowledge to 
the confirmed underpricing phenomenon in private-sector IPO. 
Based on some regularity, Perotti (1995) offered a new theory which 
exclusively explains the underpricing phenomenon for PIPO.  According to 
Perotti (1995), PIPO differs from conventional private-sector IPO to the respect 
that PIPO involves political motivation of the government.  Perotti (1995) 
distinguishes government into two types: market-oriented and populist 
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government.  A market-oriented government is willing to accept lower gross 
proceeds due to the underpricing.  This strategy is used by market-oriented 
government in order to build reputation.  In contrast, a populist government is 
not willing to accept a high underpricing and lower proceeds.  Perotti (1995) 
also shows that if the uncertainty about a future privatization policy is high, a 
larger fraction has to be sold at the initial offer.  Otherwise the market would get 
impression that the government possibly does not want to give up control rights 
over the state enterprises.  Depending on the level of political uncertainty, the 
offer has to be more underpriced. 
Furthermore, Biais and Perotti (1997) argue that government should sell 
sufficient shares to median class voters in order for the privatization program to 
be successful.  Median class voters will support the privatization efforts of the 
government.  To attract median class voters to buy enough shares, underpricing 
is necessary in most cases. The more income inequalities in population, the 
poorer the median class voters are.  Hence, the share should be more 
underpriced.  The authors also predict that governments disseminate shares 
politically by dividing issues in several trances and preferring employees and 
domestic retail investors when assigning a certain number of shares to each 
trench.   
 Studies focusing on private-sector IPOs are abundant. Two main 
phenomena are revealed: first, the IPOs are underpriced and second, in the 
long run they tend to underperform some benchmarks.  One such evidence was 
observed as early as 1975 by Ibbotson.  Then, many studies report the same 
phenomenon (Ritter 1984; Miller and Reilly, 1987; Chalk and Peavey, 1983 for 
US market; Levis, 1990 for UK; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988 for France; 
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Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) for Latin America; Finn and Higham 
(1988) for Australia; Mok and Hui, 1998 and Su and Fleisher, 1999 for China; 
Dawson, 1987 for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; and many others).  
The long-run IPO performance has been documented mainly in 
developed countries such as US, UK and France.  Ibbotson (1975) detected 
that IPOs tend to show negative performance during the second through fourth 
years following offerings.  After more than a decade, Ritter (1991) formalizes 
the study on long-run performance of IPOs and reports that IPOs underperform 
various benchmarks during the first through five years of offering.  Levis (1993) 
reports IPOs of U.K. firms are outperformed by several relevant benchmarks 36 
months from their first trading day.  Further, Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez 
(1993) also report a negative three year market-adjusted return of 47 percent in 
Brazil, three-year negative excess return of 23.7 percent for Chile and one-year 
negative excess return of 19.6 percent for Mexico.  On the other hand, the 
evidences of long-run IPO performance from emerging markets tend to show a 
different pattern.  Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1995) report that their sample of 169 
firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange during the period 1985-1989 outperform 
seasoned firms with similar characteristic for the two years and three years 
periods. Mok and Hui (1998) report a positive excess market returns over 350 
days for A-share IPOs and B-share IPOs in Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
On PIPO, Jekinson and Mayer (1988) are amongst the first that study the 
underpricing phenomenon and report that U.K. PIPOs are more underpriced 
than private-sector IPOs.  Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) report that in U.K. 
PIPOs are more underpriced than private-sector IPOs.   In Canada and 
Malaysia, the opposite is true.  Further, Choi and Nam (1998) report a general 
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tendency for PIPOs to be underpriced to a greater degree than the privately-
sector IPOs. Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) report governments 
consistently underprice SIP offers.  On the other hand, Huang and Levich 
(1998) report no evidence that PIPOs’ underpricing differs from that of private-
sector IPOs.  More recently, Aussenegg (2000) reports that there is no 
tendency for Polish government to underprice initial offers more than private 
company issuers do.  On the long-run PIPO behavior, Megginson, Nash, Netter 
and Schwartz (2000) report that the net returns of 159 PIPOs in their sample 
from 33 countries are significantly positive for one, three and five year periods.  
Other study by Camstock, Kish and Vasconcellos (2003) report findings that 
during the first year after the first trading day privatization offers yield 50 percent 
lower returns than the market for a sample from six countries.  At the end of fifth 
year of trading cumulative abnormal returns are -50 percent.  
In short, long-run return behavior of PIPOs and private-sector IPOs are 
similar.  The results are mixed; the tendency of underperformance is reported 
from developed capital market but over-performance is observed in emerging 
market.  Hence, more evidences are needed to come to conclusive results that 
could lead to a new theory in long-run IPO in general and PIPO in particular.  
 Studies in Malaysian initial return performance are quite extensive, but 
not much study was conducted on the long-run performance of PIPOs.   
Malaysia evidences show that average initial returns of IPOs are positive and 
higher compared to developed markets.  (Dawson, 1987; Yong, 1991;, Ku 
Ismail et.al, 1993; Mohamad, Nassir and Ariff, 1994; Nasir and Mat Zin, 1998; 
Jelic, Saadouni and Briston, 2001). Paudyal and Saadouni (1998) found that the 
long-run performance of both PIPOs and private sector IPOs over the first three 
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years show no significantly positive or negative.  Wu (1993) reports positive 
three and five year returns of 13.80 percent and 14.10 percent respectively.  
Further, Sun, Tang and Tong (2001) report no significant under- and over-
performance for first, second, third and fifth year.  However, they find 
significantly negative performance for the fourth year of seasoning.    
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Several established theories, particularly property right (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), public choice (Niskanen, 1971), and agency theory (Vickers & Yarrow, 
1989) amongst others, predict privatization will bring improvement on firm 
performance. Although, majority evidences support the prediction, still many 
cases reveal inconsistent results.  Some evidences (Megginson et. al., 1994, 
Boubakri & Cosset, 1998 and D’Sousa & Megginson, 1999 amongst others) are 
supportive to the theories but the work of Martin and Parker (1995), Newberry 
and Pollit (1997), and Harper (2001) showed otherwise.   Specific evidences 
revealed from the study conducted in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Hungary due to 
certain features related to the countries i.e.: the lack of market mechanism, 
undefined property right, the absence of competition and institutional support, 
the centralized economy. Malaysian economy does not resemble plan-economy 
countries of Eastern European Countries. Thus, the problem is why the 
privatization program in Malaysia does not always work as predicted by theories 
and what the possible determinants of the problem are.  
Malaysian Economy is different from transition economies of Eastern 
European countries. It more resembles of free economy of western countries 
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with rule and regulation are on place, property right is protected, and market 
mechanism works well.  Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the effect of 
privatization on firm performance in Malaysia will be in accordance with what 
have been predicted by the established theories. However, the critics say that 
the merits of the privatization in Malaysia are questionable. Thus, one of the 
problems is whether the Malaysian privatization program generates favorable 
impact on firm performance as predicted by theories discussed and what are 
the determinants.  
As an emerging economy, Malaysian capital market, to some extent, is 
different from the more established capital market of US and U.K. and those of 
other western countries for many respects.  Characterized by relatively a 
shorter operating history, a smaller in size, usually less knowledgeable 
investors, more speculative retail players, relatively illiquid trading, less 
regulation on disclosure, and less investment publication, capital market in 
emerging economies such as Malaysia are generally less efficient than 
developed markets.  Moreover, to some respects private-sector IPOs is a bit 
different from PIPOs.  It is logical to believe that the behavior of short-run and 
long-run performance of private-sector IPOs and PIPOs are different. 
Furthermore, the behavior of IPOs in general in Malaysia capital market may 
differ from those of developed capital markets or even of relatively less-
developed market of Eastern European capital markets.  Privatization IPOs with 
politically motivated objectives, to some extent, will distinguish themselves from 
private-sector IPOs in general.  Consequently, the problems are why the 
privatization IPOs in Malaysia is particular underpriced and what the possible 
determinants are and why in the long-run privatization IPOs from emerging 
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economies such as Malaysia are overpriced and what are the possible 
determinants are. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of privatization on the financial 
and operating performances of state owned enterprises (SOE) and to evaluate 
the determinants that possibly responsible for the variation on the performance. 
The specific objectives of the study are the following: 
1. To investigate the impact of privatization on the performance of the firm. 
2. To investigate the determinants responsible for the change in the 
performance of the firm before and after privatization. 
3. To investigate the level of initial returns gained by investors who 
participate in PIPOs. 
4. To investigate the determinants of the level of initial returns. 
5. To investigate the long-run PIPOs performance up to five years following 
privatization. 
6. To investigate the determinants of the one-, three- and five-year long-run 
PIPOs performance. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
1. What are the impacts of privatization on firm performance? 
2.  What are the determinants of the change in the performance of the firm 
before and after privatization? 
3. How much the initial returns gained by investors who participate in 
PIPOs? 
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4. What are the determinants of the PIPOs initial returns? 
5.  How the long-run PIPOs performance behaves up to five years? 
6. What are the determinants of that behavior? 
 
1.5 Scope of Study 
This research attempts to study the phenomenon of privatization in Malaysia. 
The study covers state-owned enterprises that are privatized by offering all or 
partial share to public through capital market from 1983 to 1999. Full 
privatization is not a norm in Malaysia, thus the sample comprises all partial 
privatization.  Choosing share issue privatization is not without reason; share 
issue privatization provides the most complete data.  The study is to examine 
changes in financial and operating performance of privatized firms, factors 
affecting those changes and short-term and long-term share price performance 
of privatized IPOs (PIPOs, hereafter). 
 
1.6 Research Contribution 
This study contributes to literature on privatization in several forms. First of all, it 
provides additional evidence on the impact of privatization on firms’ 
performance, the short- and long-run performance of share-issues privatizations 
(SIPs) from emerging market.  Secondly, unlike several previous studies that 
focus on the findings of impact of privatization, and short- and long-run PIPOs 
return behavior per se, this study also provide the possible factors related with 
those variations in performance.  In addition, the data is collected from a single 
country, so it is more homogeneous and hence, more robust results are 
expected. 
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Several contributions to the theory are expected from this study.  Firstly, 
a theory of soft budget constraint (related to the tendency of a government to 
give subsidies, grant soft loan and bail out ailing companies amongst others) 
which is borrowed from economic theory (which was never used before by any 
researcher to study privatization ) is applied in this research to explain the post-
privatization performance phenomenon. Secondly, a relatively new theory 
explaining the phenomenon of initial underpricing specific for PIPOs introduced 
by Perotti (1995) is used along with conventional theory of IPO underpricing.   
Thirdly, more recent data and more samples are utilized; hence the results are 
expected to be more comprehensive.  
Furthermore, two empirical contributions to the real world are identified 
from this study.  First, it provides the extent of impact of privatization on firms’ 
performance and the determinants of that performance which is very important 
for Malaysia government in designing future privatization and improving the 
mechanism for current privatization.  Second, it provides the information on the 
level of initial return long-run return behavior of IPOs, and the determinants that 
affect that performance which is very valuable to investors in their investment 
decision and in designing their security selection processes.  
 
1.7 Limitation of the Study 
The generalization of research findings from this study may be limited by 
several factors such as the number and uniformity of the samples used for the 
study.    The sample constitutes merely of state-owned enterprises privatized 
through share issued to the public.   The number of observation varies between 
30 companies for a certain statistical analysis and 37 for other analyses.  This 
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small number of sample, for instance, limits the detail analyses of the data.  
Limitation of the study is also related to the data regarding of the proxy for soft 
budget constraint.  Ideally the proxy for soft budget constraint is the amount of 
subsidies granted by government to the companies or the amount of soft loan 
received by the companies.  However, due to its sensitive nature, it is very 
difficult if not impossible to get the data.  Hence, the ratios of short-term and 
long-term debt to total assets are used.  It is expected that these ratio could 
capture the essence of soft budget constraint though the accuracy is 
compromised.  
 
1.8 Definition of Key Terms 
The following is the definition of each key term used in the thesis: 
1. Privatization - refers to the sale of all or part of a government’s equity in 
state-owned enterprise to the private sector, or to the placing of SOEs 
under private management through leases and management contracts 
(Vuylsteke, 1988). 
2. In Malaysia Privatization Policy is handled by Economic Planning Unit 
(EPU), a government agency under the office of Prime Minister. EPU 
defines privatization as the transfer to the private sector of activities and 
functions which have traditionally rested with the public sector. This 
definition applies to enterprises already owned by the Government and to 
new projects which normally have been implemented by the public 
sector. Privatization involves transfers of management responsibility, 
assets (with or without liabilities) or the rights to use assets, and 
personnel (Privatization Masterplan, 1991). 
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3. Share-issue privatization is a privatization of state-owned enterprises by 
selling shares in capital market.  
4. State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) – World Bank defined state-owned 
enterprise to include firms that all or part of the equity is owned by the 
state or government (World Bank, 1991). In Malaysia state-owned 
enterprises are known as Government-owned Entities (GOEs) which 
refers to entities that are owned by the governments: federal, state and 
local government (Privatization Masterplan, 1991). 
5. Underpricing – refers to a situation when the price of a stock at the first 
day of trading is higher than the offer price. There are two ways of 
computing the underpricing: unadjusted and adjusted by market returns 
in case the time between the date of prospectus and official listing date is 
quite awhile (various sources). 
 
1.9 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized into 8 chapters.  The first chapter introduces the recent 
phenomenon of privatization as the study background.  It also explores the 
basic problems encountered in privatization program of state-owned enterprise 
in Malaysia and poses questions to be addressed in this research. 
 In Chapter 2, the literatures on privatization are reviewed; the definition, 
reasons, and methods of privatization are described.  Moreover, the empirical 
studies are presented and some theories related to privatization are assessed 
and   discussed.   Finally,  the  Malaysian      privatization    experiences  are  
also presented as a prelude to understanding the Malaysian privatization 
program. 
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 Chapter 3 provides the literature review on capital market.  Empirical 
studies on short-run IPOs underpricing are presented.  The behavior of 
privatized firm stock price in long-run were presented and analyzed. Some 
theories of IPOs underpricing and long-run IPOs price performance are 
discussed and critically assessed.  The theoretical explanation of both was 
described in detail in this chapter. Research framework and hypothesis are 
explained in Chapter 4. Each hypothesis is preceded by a short discussion and 
generated based on literature reviewed on the previous chapters. Chapter 5 
presents the methodology adopted in this study.  The research design used for 
this study is a quantitative approach in which the secondary data like financial 
statements and other documents from capital market are extensively used. In 
Chapter 6, the results of the study of privatization performance were presented.  
The performance of companies before and after being privatized, various 
factors associated with them were investigated.  Furthermore, the results of the 
study of the performance of share price in capital market in the short-run and 
the long-run were presented.  Various factors having significant relationship 
were also investigated. Chapter 7 provides the synthesis of the results of the 
study and discussion.  The findings of the study are summarized and 
implications of the study are assessed. Furthermore, some policy 
recommendations are derived from the findings and explained in this chapter.  
Finally, areas for further researches are identified. The main research findings 
and the overall conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATIZATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Privatization could be considered as a program of transition from a planned 
economy to a market-based economy. It has been implemented in the 
developed, less developed and emerging economies. The degree of 
implementation for each country could be different, however, the objectives are 
very much similar one of which is to improve the lackluster and unsatisfactory 
performance of state-owned enterprises. This chapter aims to review the 
phenomenon of privatization. Section 2.2 presents definitions and objectives of 
privatization. Privatization programs around the world and in Malaysia are 
presented in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 respectively. Section 2.5 discusses 
the theory behind privatization. Section 2.6 present empirical studies on 
privatization. Section 2.7 described the determinants of post-privatization 
performance and finally Section 2.8 summarizes the chapter.  
 
2.2 Definitions and Objectives of Privatization 
Privatization program has been adopted and implemented by almost all 
governments all over the world for more than two and half decades, yet many 
people have not had an opportunity to understand this phenomenon.  The 
unclear and ambiguous understanding of the term may lead to confusion for the 
readers. Thus, it is essential to dedicate a section for definition and objective of 
privatization in this chapter. This section is intended to give readers an 
understanding of privatization programs. This section comprises of definition of 
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privatization to give readers the understanding of privatization and objective of 
privatization which explain what privatization for.  
 
2.2.1 Definitions of Privatization 
Different authors define privatization differently. Some authors define 
privatization narrowly and some others define privatization broadly. Kikeri, 
Nellis, and Shirley (1994) define privatization narrowly to mean the transfer of a 
majority of ownership from states to private sectors by the sale of ongoing 
concerns or assets following liquidation. Ramamurti (1992) argues that a 
privatization “refers to the sale of all or parts of a governments’ equity in state-
owned enterprises to the private sector.” World Bank (1996) defined 
privatization as “the divestiture by the state of enterprises, land or other assets.” 
Hanke (1987) defined privatization as a transfer of assets and services 
functions from public to private hands. These authors emphasize activities 
ranging from selling state-owned enterprises to contracting out public services 
with private contractors. Thus, the privatization is the transfer of ownership fully 
or partially from governments to private sectors through various methods such 
as direct sales, share issues, leasing, etc. Some other authors look at 
privatization as a wider phenomenon comprising of interrelated activities that 
reduce the government ownership and control of enterprises and that promote 
private sector participation in the management of state-owned enterprises.  
Vickers and Wright (1998) view privatization as an umbrella term for a variety of 
different policy that are loosely linked which mean the strengthening of the 
market of the expense of the state. Hartley and Parker (1991) define 
privatization as “the introduction of market forces into an economy in order to 
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make enterprises to work on a more commercial basis. They mean that 
privatization includes denationalization or selling off state-owned assets, 
deregulation (liberalization) competitive tendering, as well as the introduction of 
private ownership and market arrangements in the ex-socialist states. Cook and 
Kirkpatrick (1988) defined privatization as a range of different policy initiatives 
intended to change the balance between the public and private sector and the 
service they provide.  
 In Malaysia privatization is generally defined as the transfer of ownership 
from public to private sector. It could also be referred to the changing status of a 
business, service or industry from state, government or public to private 
ownership or control. Occasionally, the term privatization is to include the use of 
private contractors to provide services previously rendered by the public sector. 
Full privatization is not the norm in Malaysia, hence most privatization involves 
transferring only some of the government ownership. In sum, privatization is a 
policy of transferring government ownership to private ownership through 
various methods. Based on these various definitions of privatization discussed 
above, this study uses the definition of privatization which is a bit narrow that is 
share issue privatization (SIP, hereafter). In this definition, privatization includes 
the transfers of a full or partial government ownership to private ownership 
through the sale of equity in the capital market.   
 
2.2.2 Objectives of Privatization 
Privatization of state-owned enterprises is based on a strong proposition that 
private sector enterprises are subject to economic disciplines which are not 
present in the state enterprises. The disciplines of competition and the need to 
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earn a profit in order to grow keep private sector enterprises relatively more 
efficient than their public sector counterparts. Therefore, one common objective 
of privatization by transferring state ownership to private investors is to make 
the enterprise become more efficient and more profitable. The World Bank 
(1996) reports that in established market economies and middle to high income 
developing economies it is believed that private ownership is a significant 
determinant of economic performance. The privatization may also have other 
objectives such as changing behavior of economic agents and discipline of the 
market, reducing budget deficit to harness savings and finally promoting wide 
share ownership.  
On the other hand, different countries have their own specific objectives 
of privatization of state-owned enterprises. Those objectives depend upon the 
condition and the situation the countries are facing. However, whatever the 
political motives of those countries toward privatization policy, every country 
tends to have common objectives of increasing firm efficiency and profitability 
and reducing government financial burden.  
 
2.3 Privatization Program around the World 
Privatization is moving forward very quickly in many countries throughout the 
world. The rationale for privatization is now widely accepted after decades of 
discussion. In this section recent the developments of the privatization program 
in major region around the world are reviewed briefly.   
Latin America has led the developing world in terms of the pace of its 
privatization. Governments in Latin American consider privatization as a quick 
means of economic reform, specifically, as a mean of attracting foreign 
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investment and fostering economic liberalization. Privatization progress in this 
region has been mixed. Some countries have been successful while some 
others are only beginning.  
Asian nations have made significant progress toward achieving their 
privatization goals and are now beginning to privatize larger state-owned 
enterprises and public utilities. In Asia privatization through public offering is the 
most common method. In addition to domestic offers, Asian countries opened 
their stock markets to foreign investors as well. Privatization efforts have 
commenced in China since a couple of years ago. Several high-publicity initial 
public offerings (IPOs) on regional stock exchanges have occurred. Additionally, 
central governments in China had order state governments to provide a list of 
local agencies suitable for privatization. These are China's first serious steps 
toward large scale privatization. To date, most private sector involvement has 
been in the form of joint ventures with foreign partners.  
Although nations like Pakistan have ambitious plans, the process of 
privatization in these countries continues to move slowly. Labor concerns and 
lack of capital have hindered privatization efforts in that country. Privatization is 
new to Thailand and Vietnam and their governments have not developed 
longstanding commitment to the process. In Thailand, state-owned enterprises 
account for a large portion of government revenues. Vietnam has recently 
initiated a privatization program, but that country is more concerned with 
attracting capital from foreign sources in the form of aid and investment.  
Finally, labor issues have continued to play a role in shaping privatization 
strategy. Employees of state-owned enterprises are often concerned about the 
potential job loss caused by the elimination of redundant positions in privatized 
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firms. The governments of the region have made concerted attempts to address 
these concerns in their privatization plans. Examples of programs that 
guarantee worker jobs and/or retraining can be found in Pakistan and Malaysia. 
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka all of which make extensive use of 
employee ownership initiatives, such as employee stock ownership programs 
(ESOPs).  
A few years ago privatization and private sector development were 
relatively insignificant in Africa. Now, they are parts of the economic reform 
programs of most African countries. Countries in this region have so far 
approached privatization hesitantly, mostly as a revenue-enhancing measure or 
to relieve the budget of the strains of debts incurred by state-owned enterprises. 
Now, several countries have established and maintained successful 
privatization programs capable of carrying out transactions on a sustainable 
basis. These countries including Egypt, Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria amongst 
others are continuing programs of moderate success from previous years. 
Morocco and Egypt have probably been most successful in making the recent 
transition from the planning stage to implementation.  
Despite a seemingly strong commitment to the concept of privatization, 
many of the other sub-Saharan countries have had difficulty sustaining an 
active program. Tanzania, for example, initially moved forward politically with 
privatization but was unable to sustain the effort because of sharp declines in its 
already weak economy. The Seychelles has maintained a strong public sector 
and has shown no immediate intention to develop a privatization program even 
though it is a middle income country with access to capital through its tourist 
trade.  
